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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter, pursuant to Section
78-2a-3(2)(e), Utah Code Annotated (1953, as amended).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES FOR REVIEW
a.

Did the trial court err in determining that there

was sufficient evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, to show
that the Defendant wilfully used unlawful force or violence
upon the person of another without basis or self-defense?
b.

Is the ruling by the trial court against the clear

weight of the evidence, given the testimony of all the witnesses?
c.

Did the trial court err in speculating that a touching

occurred sufficient to constitute a battery?
d.

Is the guilty verdict valid when it is not based on

any specific testimony relied upon by the court, but by the court's
own inferences and speculation?
e.

Did the City fulfill its duty to establish beyond a

reasonable doubt the necessary elements for a battery?
f.

Did the prosecutor fail in her duty by not providing

defense counsel with a known written statement of a witness,
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which the court relied upon, and later found to be biased against
the Defendant?
STANDARD FOR REVIEW
In reviewing a bench trial for sufficiency of evidence, the trial court's judgment
is sustained unless it is against the clear weight of the evidence, or if the appellate court
otherwise reaches a definite andfirmconviction that a mistake has been made. Spanish Fork
Citv v. Brvan. 975 P.2d 501 (Ut.App. 1999); State v. Layman, 953 P.2d 782, 786 (Ut.App.
1998). However, before a conviction is upheld, "it must be supported by a quantum of
evidence concerning each element of the crime as charged, from which the [factfinder] may
base its conclusion of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Murphy, 617 P.2d 399, 402
(Utah 1980). In addition, "[a] guilty verdict is not legally valid if it is based solely on
inferences that give rise to only remote or speculative possibilities of guilt." State v. Workman,
852 P.2d 981, 985 (Utah 1993).
Whether a prosecutor adequately discloses information under Rule 16 of the Utah
Rules of Criminal Procedure is a legal question subject to review for correctness. State v.
Knight. 734 P.2d 913 (Utah 1987).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of case and course of proceedings. The Appellant Taylor was

originally charged with ASSAULT W/SUBSTANTIAL BODILY INJURY, § 76-5-102(3)(a),
a Class A Misdemeanor in Salt Lake City on or about December 20, 2000, in a confrontation
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with the alleged victim, Michael D. Breck. The charges were later amended to a BATTERY
in violation of Salt Lake City Code § 11.08.020, a Class B Misdemeanor. The Amended
Information wasfiledon May 9, 2002, accusing Taylor of willfully using unlawful force or
violence upon the person of another.
Taylor made a Motion for Discovery, under the Rules of Criminal Procedure
on July 12, 2001. This included a request for the identity of all witnesses to be called at trial
and written statements obtained from the Defendant or any witnesses.
The case proceeded with a bench trial on May 10, 2002, before Judge Dennis
M. Fuchs of the Third District Court. The following people were called as witnesses:
Michael D. Breck; Joshua R. Braithwaite; Officer Aram Arslanian; Gary Holstein; Patrick
Nelligan and Thomas Taylor.
Mr. Breck, Mr. Taylor, Mr. Braithwaite, and Mr. Holstein, all testified that
only one incident occurred. Mr. Breck, Mr. Taylor, Mr. Holstein, and Mr. Nelligan, all
testified that the incident occurred by a delivery ramp between two parked vehicles, on the
west side of the Brick's Club. One vehicle was described as a large boxy linen delivery van
and the other, was the Defendant's vehicle. Mr. Holstein and Mr. Taylor both testified that
the parties were arguing and then Mr. Breck lunged at Mr. Taylor; and Mr. Taylor then, put
his hands up in defense, and that after the incident, Mr. Taylor immediately walked away and
went into the building.
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Mr. Braithwaite testified that he was driving south on 600 West at 15-20 mph
when he happened to "glance" over and saw the incident occur at the corner of the block, not
in front of the ramp on the west side of Brick's, and not between the two vehicles. He did
not see the two vehicles, between which the incident occurred, according to all other
witnesses, and claims he was able to watch the matter for 15-30 seconds, while driving 20
mph. He testified that there were a number of times, six to eight, where Mr. Taylor shoved
Mr. Breck with his hands to his chest, sending Mr. Breck back several feet each time.
At the conclusion of trial, Judge Fuchs did not rely on the testimony of the
Defendant, or the alleged victim, or the testimony of Mr. Holstein or Mr. Nelligan; but relied
solely on the testimony of Mr. Braithwaite. Judge Fuchs did not actually believe Mr.
Braithwaite's account of the incident as he testified, i.e., that the alleged victim was shoved in
the chest 6 or 8 times, taking several steps back each time, and did not make such a finding;
but Judge Fuchs went on to speculate that a physical confrontation must have occurred. The
court found that Mr. Braithwaite was the only one that had an opportunity to observe the
incident, when he was driving down the road at 15-20 mph.
It was also discovered for the first time at trial, that Mr. Braithwaite, provided
a written statement to the prosecutor. This was only discovered through cross-examination by
defense counsel. This written statement contradicted Mr. Braithwaite's testimony at trial.
After receiving the written statement, it was ultimately discovered that Mr. Braithwaite had
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actually been kicked out of the Brick's Club, by Mr. Taylor for violating club rules, and
therefore, he was not an unbiased or independent witness.
After trial, the court found Taylor guilty and Taylor was sentenced, the same
day, May 10, 2002, to 90 days jail, all suspended and a $250.00fine,payable within 30 days.
The court agreed to stay the matter if appealed. A Notice of Appeal wasfiledon June 7,2002.
B.

Statement of Facts,

1.

This matter arose, as a result of an incident on December 20, 2000,

between the Defendant, Tom Taylor and the alleged victim, Michael Breck, west of the
Defendant's property located on the corner of 600 West and 200 South, at a business called
"Bricks", owned by the Defendant. (Rec. 62, Trial Tr. p. 6).
2.

Taylor wasfirstcharged with ASSAULT W/SUBSTANTIAL BODILY

INJURY, § 76-5-1022(3)(a), a Class A Misdemeanor, on February 12, 2001. (Rec. 1) .
3.

There wasn't any substantial bodily injury, and therefore, a day before

trial, on May 9,2002, the charge was amended to a BATTERY in violation of Salt Lake City
Code § 11.08.020, a Class B Misdemeanor. The Amended Information, accuses Taylor of
willfully using unlawful force or violence upon the person of another. (Rec. 49).
4.

On July 13, 2001, Taylor filed a written Motion for Discovery,

requesting among other things, written statements of any witnesses, and the identity of all
witnesses to be called at trial. (Rec. 6-8).
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5.

The case proceeded to trial on May 10, 2002. The alleged victim,

Michael Breck, was the first to testify. He testified that he was on the Defendant's property
trying to locate utility lines for Questar Gas. (Rec. 62, p. 6).
6.

Mr. Breck testified that he had put down the wrong marks initially and

was trying to destroy these marks. (Rec. 62, p. 12). That Mr. Taylor approached him and
told him he was trespassing. (Rec. 62, p. 12). Mr. Breck further testified that he was asked
to leave the premises, but he refused. (Rec. 62, p. 20). Mr. Breck maintained that he
answered all of Mr. Taylor's questions politely and never raised his voice. (Rec. 62, pp. 12
&18).
7.

Mr. Breck then testified that as he was stepping off some paint marks,

he was grabbed by the left shoulder and twisted, and grabbed by the right shoulder and
shaken out into the road. (Rec. 62, p. 13). On cross-examination, Mr. Breck testified that
there was just one incident on a gravely surface. (Rec. 62, p. 21). He also testified that he
never lost his balance on the gravely surface or fell to the ground. (Rec. 62, p. 21). Mr.
Breck received no visible injury from the alleged incident. (Rec. 62, p. 18).
8.

Mr. Breck further testified that he asked an alleged witness, Joshua

Braithwaite to write a statement of the incident. (Rec. 62, p. 16). Mr. Braithwaite did write
a statement and he gave it to the prosecutor. (Rec. 62, p.21). Defense counsel only learned
of this written statement at trial during cross-examination, although, Mr. Braithwaite claims
he gave a copy of it to the prosecutor.
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9.

Although Mr. Braithwaite claims he gave the statement to the

prosecutor, the prosecutor claimed that she never received the original, but that she had been
given a copy of the statement. (Rec. 62, p. 22). A copy of the statement was finally
produced during trial, after its existence was discovered by defense counsel during crossexamination. The prosecutor had the statement in her file at court. (Rec. 62, p. 22). It was
later discovered that Mr. Braithwaite knew Mr. Taylor; knew he was the owner of the
business, as he referred to him as the "owner" in his written statement, because Mr.
Braithwaite had been kicked out of the club previously by Mr. Taylor for violating club
rules. Mr. Braithwaite was not an independent witness, but had an axe to grind against the
Defendant. This would have been discovered before trial, if disclosure would have been
timely made.
10.

Mr. Braithwaite testified next. He testified that he was in the area

reading water meters for Salt Lake City. (Rec. 62, p. 25) He was driving 15- 20 mph on
600 West, and did not notice any vehicles parked on 600 West. (Rec. 62, p. 29) That while
he was driving he "glanced" over to his left, and saw the Defendant, Taylor, shove Mr. Breck
in the chest area. (Rec. 62, p. 27, line 11). Mr. Braithwaite did not see the victim grabbed
by the left shoulder, the right shoulder, or any other place, as testified to by the alleged
victim, but only that the alleged victim was shoved to the chest. (Rec. 62, p. 34).
11.

Mr. Braithwaite further testified that it was not just one time but several

times, anywhere from 6 to 8 times, (Rec. 62, p. 35); and that with each shove Mr. Breck was
taking 2-3 steps backwards. (Rec. 62, p. 36). Mr. Braithwaite testified that the incident
10

took place on the far northwest corner of the Bricks building, and that no vehicles were
present on the side of the building at the time. (Rec. 62., p. 26). This statement is contrary
to the testimony of all the other witnesses, including the alleged victim, Mr. Taylor, Mr.
Holstein, and Mr. Nelligan, who all testified that the incident took place west of the ramp,
not on the northwest corner; and that there were two vehicles parked on the west side of the
building, and that the incident took place between these two vehicles.
12.

Mr. Braithwaite further testified that he only spoke with Mr. Breck on

the date of the incident. (Rec. 62, p. 33). Mr. Braithwaite's written statement which was
never provided by the prosecutor, indicated that Mr. Braithwaite talked to both Mr. Taylor
and to Mr. Breck that day. The statement contradicts Mr. Braithwaite's testimony at the
trial. Mr. Braithwaite testified that the 6-8 violent shoves from Mr. Taylor to Mr. Breck,
were from Mr. Taylor's hands to Mr. Breck's chest. (Rec. 62, pp. 34 & 35).
13.

Salt Lake City Police Officer, Aaron Arslanian, then testified. He first

talked to Mr. Breck, the alleged victim. (Rec. 62, p. 40). Then he talked to Mr. Taylor.
(Rec. 62, p. 41) The officer saw Mr. Taylor's black jeep parked on 6th West where the
incident occurred. (Rec. 62, p. 42). Mr. Taylor explained that Mr. Breck kept coming
towards him and that he had to put up his hands to defend himself. (Rec. 62, p. 42).
14.

The officer also testified that Mr. Breck told him that he had refused to

answer Mr. Taylor's questions. The officer testified that Mr. Breck said, "I refused to
answer Mr. Taylor, wouldn't talk to him," and that this was consistent to what Mr. Taylor
had told him, that Mr. Breck would not talk to him. (Rec. 62, p. 44).
11

15.

At this point the City rested. The Defendant called Mr. Gary Holstein.

Mr. Holstein testified that on the 20th day of December, 2000, he was sitting in the upstairs
office at the Bricks business. (Rec. 62, p. 46). That the office has eight or nine security
cameras that cover many areas inside and outside the building, including the west side ramp
area, where the incident occurred. (Rec. 62, pp. 46 & 47). Mr. Holstein testified that there
is a ramp on this side where deliveries are made; and in fact, at the time of the incident, a
delivery was being made by American Linen, and that there was an American Linen truck,
a large boxy truck, similar to a UPS truck, parked on the street. (Rec. 62, p. 48).
16.

Mr. Holstein testified that he saw Mr. Taylor and Mr. Breckfromthe

west side security camera. He testified that he saw the whole incident, until Mr. Taylor
walked away to come into the building. Mr. Holstein testified that Mr. Breck came towards
Mr. Taylor in a very aggressive manner and that Mr. Taylor raised his hands in defense.
(Rec. 62, p. 49). Mr. Holstein testified that Mr. Taylor did not strike, or take any offensive
action, against Mr. Breck. (Rec. 62, p. 49) Mr. Holstein further testified that after this
confrontation, Mr. Taylor immediately returned inside the office and was surprised at how
aggressive Mr. Breck had been and wanted to call Mr. Breck's supervisor. (Rec. 62, p. 50).
Mr. Holstein further testified that Mr. Breck turned and walked out of the view of the
security camera. Then Mr. Holstein testified that he walked a few steps to the window
overlooking the area; and Mr. Taylor then arrived at the office. (Rec. 62, p. 50).
17.

Mr. Patrick Nelligan, a delivery driver for American Linen company

testified next. He testified that on December 20, 2000, he was making a delivery to the
12

Bricks business, and pulled up to the west entrance in his box van with a delivery of fresh
linen. (Rec. 62, p. 72). Mr. Nelligan noticed Mr. Taylor arguing with another man between
his boxy delivery van and the vehicle parked next to the delivery van, west of the delivery
ramp. (Rec. 62, p. 75) Mr. Nelligan testified that he heard Mr. Taylor ask Mr. Breck to
leave. (Rec. 62, p. 75). Mr. Nelligan further testified that both men were arguing loud
enough to be heard; and that he did not witness any physical contact between them. (Rec.
62, p. 75).
18.

Finally Mr. Taylor took the stand and testified that on December 20,

2000, he was at the Bricks business. He drove up to the west side, parked his car to the right
(south) of the delivery van, noticed that an individual was marking utility lines. (Rec. 62,
p. 85). Mr. Taylor asked who he worked for and was told "Sprint," (Rec. 62, p. 86).
19.

Mr. Taylor attempted to talk to the individual, Mr. Breck, but Mr. Breck

ignored him. (Rec. 62, p. 85). Mr. Breck then started wiping out the previous markings on
the property and Mr. Taylor asked "What are you doing?" (Rec. 62, p. 86). The marks being
removed were different than the ones Mr. Breck was putting down, so Mr. Taylor assumed
the marks being removed were not his. (Rec. 62, p. 86). Mr. Taylor then said, "Hey, stop
it. You need to leave," Mr. Breck then used obscene language and turned violently towards
Mr. Taylor and lunged towards him. (Rec. 62, pp. 88 & 89).
20.

Mr. Taylor testified that he raised his hands so as to protect himself, at

which time Mr. Breck made contact with Mr. Taylor's hands. (Rec. 62, pp. 88 & 89). Mr.
Taylor testified that no further physical contact took place between the parties. (Rec. 62.,
13

p. 89). He did not grab Mr. Breck on the right shoulder, the left shoulder, or anyplace else,
and did not shove him. (Rec. 62, pp. 89 & 90).
21.

At the conclusion of trial, Judge Fuchs found that both Mr. Breck and

Mr. Taylor were biased and had very selective memories. (Rec. 62, p. 108).
22.

The court found that Mr. Holstein was honest and reliable, and that Mr.

Holstein testified to what he observed, but that there was an awful lot of time that he wasn't
able to observe. (Rec. 62, p. 109) The court then speculated, "I don't know whether it
happened later or before the time Mr. Holstein actually got up and walked over to the
window." The court went on to find the City's theory on this to be only "supposition". (Rec.
62, p. 109).
23.

The court found that Mr. Braithwaite's testimony was not consistent

with Mr. Breck or Mr. Taylor, but that Mr. Braithwaite, "is the one independent witness who
really does have an opportunity to observe what occurred, and the court does believe him
when he stated that he observed some kind of an incident occurring between Mr. Breck and
Mr. Taylor." (Rec. 62, p. 110)
24.

The court relied on one person's testimony, Mr. Braithwaite. (Rec. 62,

p. 110). The court then found that some sort of a physical confrontation must have occurred,
based on the testimony of Mr. Braithwaite, although the court found that it did not occur as
Mr. Braithwaite described it. (Rec. 62. p. 110).
25.

The court also found that Mr. Nelligan was not prejudiced for or against

Mr. Taylor, but he couldn't see what happened. (Rec. 62, p. 109). Mr. Nelligan did observe
14

what was happening that day. He saw the cars parked as the other witnesses described them;
and saw 2 people arguing. (Rec. 62, p. 74). He heard raised voices, heard Mr. Taylor ask
Mr. Breck to leave the premises, and heard Mr. Breck use vulgar language towards Mr.
Taylor. (Rec. 62, p. 75). Nevertheless, the court discounted his testimony completely.
26.

After trial, the time for sentencing was waived, and Taylor was sentenced

the same day, to 90 days jail, with the jail time suspended upon the payment of fines and fees
in the amount of $250.00. (Rec. 62, p. 114). The fine was order to be paid within 30 days,
to be stayed if appealed. (Rec. 62, p. 115).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The trial court found that a battery occurred in this case, not based on the
testimony presented at trial, but based on possibilities and probabilities. The court relies on
one witness, Mr. Braithwaite, whose testimony is inconsistent with the other witnesses, the
Defendant, and even the alleged victim. Further, the court does not accept the testimony of Mr.
Braithwaite, but merely refers to his testimony in speculating that "some kind of an incident
occurred" between Mr. Breck and Mr. Taylor. Such conjecture by the trial court, cannot
support a criminal conviction and cannot be a substitute for certainty beyond a reasonable
doubt. Spanish Fork Citv v. Brvam 975 P.2d 501, 504. (Ut.App. 1999).
The prosecution failed to disclose a written statement from an alleged eye witness
to the incident. The Defendant was entitled to such information; and such information
sufficiently creates a likelihood of a different result, going to the credibility of the one witness,
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that the court believed; that such failure was prejudicial to the Defendant, sufficient to warrant
reversal of the conviction. State v. Martin, 984 P.2d 975 (Utah 1999).
ARGUMENT
I.

THE EVIDENCE RELIED UPON BY THE TRIAL
COURT WAS INSUFFICIENT TO ESTABLISH
BATTERY BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT.

The City has the burden of establishing beyond a reasonable doubt that the
Defendant committed each element of the crime charged. Spanish Fork City v. Bryan, 975
P.2d 501 (Ut.App. 1999). Before a conviction is upheld, "it must be supported by a quantum
of evidence concerning each element of the crime as charged, from which the [factfinder] may
base its conclusion of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Murphy, 617 P.2d 399, 402
(Utah 1980). In addition, "[a] guilty verdict is not legally valid if it is based solely on
inferences that give rise to only remote or speculative possibilities of guilt." State v. Workman,
852 P.2d 981, 985 (Utah 1993).
In this case, the trial court did not place any weight on the testimony of Mr.
Taylor or the victim, Mr. Breck. The trial court relied on one person, Mr. Braithwaite.
However, the trial court did not find the facts as Mr. Braithwaite described them, but rather
proceeded on inference and speculation, that some contact had occurred. This speculation is
not based on sufficient evidence for the fact finder to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
State v. Murphv. 617 P.2d 399, 402 (Utah 1980).
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Such speculation, given the testimony of the other witnesses, is against the clear
weight of the evidence. Mr. Braithwaite did not have the best opportunity to view the incident.
Mr. Braithwaite was driving in the area at 15-20 mph when he happened to "glance" over his
left shoulder. He didn't notice the vehicles parked on 600 West that all the other witnesses
described. He also never saw the alleged victim grabbed by the shoulders as described by the
alleged victim. Rather, he testified that Mr. Breck was being shoved six to eight times, with
shoves to the chest; and that it was not just a single time, but several times; and that with each
shove Mr. Breck was taking 2-3 steps back. This is contrary to all the other testimony,
including the victim, who claimed that he was grabbed and twisted by the Defendant once.
The Court did not believe that the victim was shoved six times or eight times or
that he was pushed back 24 or 30 feet, as testified to by Mr. Braithwaite, but then goes on to
say that based on Mr. Braithwaite's testimony, there was some physical confrontation. (Rec.
62, p. 110). This is mere inference and speculation, especially in light of the testimony of the
Defendant, the alleged victim, himself (that he was not pushed) and Mr. Holstein who
witnessed the specific incident.
Furthermore, the testimony of Mr. Braithwaite not only contradicted the
testimony of the Defendant and the alleged victim, but also was inconsistent with his own
written statement that he gave on location, which was never disclosed to Defendant's counsel.
For example, in his written statement Mr. Braithwaite states he was driving down the street
and glanced over and saw the owner of the place grab this "employie" [sic] and shove him off
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the property. He also reported that he stopped and talked to both of them and asked if
everything was OK. At trial he testified he never saw the Defendant grab Mr. Breck, and that
he only talked to Mr. Breck after die incident. He also testified that afterwards, Mr. Taylor
immediately left and went inside the building.
The trial court found Mr. Holstein to be honest, but found that there was an
awful lot of time that Mr. Holstein wasn't able to observe. However, there is no evidence of
this lack of observation. Mr. Holstein, testified that he watched the entire incident, until Mr.
Taylor left to come into the building. Everyone, including the victim, Mr. Holstein, and Mr.
Taylor all testified there was only one incident, and afterwards Mr. Taylor immediately went
into the building. The court's questioning as to whether the alleged incident took place, after
Mr. Holstein got up and walked to the window, is not in evidence, as Mr. Holstein testified
he watched until Mr. Taylor walked away and Mr. Breck walked away out of the view of the
security camera. Regardless, such a claim without any evidence would be as the court phrased
it only "supposition." (Rec. 62, p. 109).
Criminal convictions cannot rest on conjecture or supposition. They must be
established by proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Neither possibilities nor probabilities can
substitute for certainty beyond a reasonable doubt. Spanish Fork City v. Bryan. 975 P.2d 501,
504 (Ut.App. 1999), citing State v. Murphy. 617 P.2d at 402 ("Criminal convictions may not
be based upon conjectures or probabilities and before we can uphold a conviction it must be
supported by a quantum of evidence concerning each element of the crime as charged from
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which the jury may base its conclusion beyond a reasonable doubt"); See also State v. George,
481 P.2d 667 (Utah 1971).
To find that speculative inferences can constitute proof beyond a reasonable
doubt is to attack one of the most sacred constitutional safeguards at its core. State v.
Workman, 852 P.2d 981, 987 (Utah 1993). When an inference of guilt does not logically flow
from the evidence, it is incumbent on the reviewing court to set the verdict aside. Id. at 987.
II.

THE CITY'S FAILURE TO DISCLOSE THE
WRITTEN STATEMENT OF BRAITHWAITE
WAS PREJUDICIAL AND HARMFUL ERROR.

Rule 16 of the Utah R. of Crim. P. governs the disclosure of evidence in a
criminal case. Rule 16(a)(4) requires the disclosure of evidence known to the prosecutor that
tends to negate the guilt of the accused, mitigate the guilt of the defendant, or mitigate the
degree of the offense for reduced punishment; and (5) requires the disclosure of any other item
of evidence which the court determines on good cause should be made available to the
defendant in order for the defendant to adequately prepare his defense. Rule 16(b) requires that
the disclosure be made a soon as practicable following the filing of chairges and before the
defendant is required to plead. The prosecutor has a continuing duty to make such disclosures.
In the case of State v. Knight. 734 P.2d 913 (Utah 1987) the Utah Supreme
Court stated that the prosecutor under Rule 16 must: (1) either produce all of the material
requested or must identify explicitly those portions of the request for which no responsive
material will be provided; and (2) must continue to disclose such material on an ongoing basis
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to the defendant. Id. Due process requires the state to disclose even unrequested information,
which may or may not be exculpatory. State v. Worthen, 765 P.2d 839 (Utah 1988). CL
Parsons v. Galetka, 57 F.Supp 1151 (D.Utah 1999) (under this rule, which imposes a broader
disclosure obligation on the prosecutor than does the federal rule, the prosecutor is obligated
to make disclosure on a continuing basis without a request).
In State v. Knight, supra, the Court went on to say that such an error warrants
reversal only if it is "harmful," i.e., "only if a review of the record persuades the court that
without the error there was a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable result for the
defendant." Id. The question is therefore, first, whether the defendant was entitled to the
information and, second, if he was, whether that information would create a reasonable
likelihood of a more favorable result such that the confidence in the outcome is undermined.
State v. Martin, 984 P.2d 975 (Utah 1999).
To the first prong there is no question, but that the concealed evidence in this
case, would have been admissible. It was a written statement made by an alleged witness to
the incident. The evidence was in fact admitted by the trial court, after it was discovered to
exist by the Defendant in the middle of the trial. Focusing on the second prong, the
information may have affected the outcome of the case, if it would have been provided in a
more timely manner.
Failure to disclose in a timely manner is not harmless error in this case, as Mr.
Braithwaite is the only witness that the trial court relied on in finding the Defendant guilty.
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The statement had important information and facts that were inconsistent with Mr.
Braithwaite's testimony at trial; and which ultimately resulted in the discovery or Mr.
Braithwaite's bias and prejudice against Mr. Taylor. This may have affected the outcome, as
the court relied on Mr. Braithwaite's testimony in large part, based on his assumed
independence. This assumption could have been challenged at trial, had it been produced
timely. Such strong impeachment evidence would go to the central issue of the case, and Mr.
Braithwaite's credibility on the stand. This is not harmless error. State v. Martin, 984 P.2d
975 (Utah 1999).
CONCLUSION
The trial court relied on the testimony of one person, Mr. Braithwaite.
However, the trial court did not find the facts as Mr. Braithwaite described them, but rather
proceeded on inference and speculation, that "some kind of an incident" probably occurred.
This speculation is not based on sufficient evidence for the fact finder to find guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt. Possibilities and probabilities are no substitute for certainty beyond a
reasonable doubt.
The prosecutor failed to disclose a written statement made by Mr. Braithwaite,
the sole witness the trial court relied upon, made soon after the incident. The statement
contained facts and information that was inconsistent with Mr. Braithwaite's testimony at trial.
Such evidence goes to the credibiUty of Mr. Braithwaite and his testimony at trial, a critical
issue in the case. Therefore, such failure was sufficient to warrant reversal of the conviction.
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The Appellant seeks a determination from this court that sufficient evidence was
not presented to overcome the burden of certainty beyond a reasonable doubt; and that
information was not properly disclosed, that resulted in prejudice to the Defendant; and that
based on the foregoing, the conviction of the Defendant should be reversed.
DATED this / ^

day of November, 2002.

/

^

^

/

^

F. Kevin Bond
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ADDENDUM
A.

Trial Exhibit Number 1. Written statement by Mr. Braithwaite.

B.

Transcript of the trial court's oral decision. (Rec. 62, pp. 108-112).
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EXHIBIT A
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1 happens at that point — I think he's unlawfully there.
2

I think he was there unlawfully.

He was asked to

3 leave. He doesn't do it. He turns to Mr. Taylor. Limited
4 contact. Certainly who was the aggressor?

I think it was

5 Mr. Breck, and what was he doing even being there at that
6 point?
7

He should have left.
Mr. Taylor goes in his own building.

He leaves. He

8 doesn't come out. Even when the police arrive he invites them
9 in. He doesn't go back out. What does Mr. Breck do? He
10 remains on the premises. He sits out there, and we sit and
11 watch him on the monitors, and we call.
12

I think he did anything that a reasonable person could

13 be expected to do to try to avoid the conflict, considering what
14 went on that day.
15 of force?

Certainly was there a willful or unlawful use

I don't think so.

I don't see that.

16

THE COURT: Okay.

17

MS. PARKINSON: No, your Honor.

18

THE COURT: You know, I listened to all their testimony

Any rebuttal?

19 and I listened to all the argument and I have to be honest
20 with you. The only two people that I think have any bias and
21 selective memory in regards to this trial are Mr. Breck and
22 Mr. Taylor.

I think they both have very selective memories as

23 to what occurred.
24

I think all the other witnesses, even though the City

25 tried to argue that they're not credible and that they have some

F" X Hi »»-*» - *•*
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1 bias, I think were pretty honest and I don't think that their
2 bias enters into it.
3

I think that Mr. —

4 who is Mr. Holstein.

let's start with the employee

I think that Mr. Holstein is honest

5 and I don't necessarily think that Mr. Holstein would lie on
6 Mr. Taylor's behalf.

I think he testified to what he observed,

7 but I think there was an awful lot of time that he wasn't able
8 to observe. He said he was in his office working. He says his
9 attention was drawn to the cameras when he heard an argument.
10

What we don't know, as I understand it, one of the

11 theories the State is going — the City is going under is the
12 pushing and shoving happened later. I don't know whether it
13 happened later or before, but there was a time period that
14 Mr. Holstein was not observing what occurred on the monitors
15 when he actually got up and walked over to the window. They
16 tried to say that that's the exact amount of time that it
17 took Mr. Taylor to come into the building, but that's only
18 supposition.
19

We have Mr. Hoi —

not Mr. Holstein — Mr. Nelligan,

20 who worked for the linen. I don't think there's any bias or
21 prejudice for or against Mr. Taylor. I don't think his job
22 depends on whether Mr. Taylor is happy with what he testifies to
23 or not. He delivers for American Linen, but I think the crucial
24 part of his testimony was he heard them arguing.

He couldn't

25 see anything that happened outside. Then he took the linens
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1 inside, and in fact he purposely tried not to see, because he
2 didn't want anything to do with it.
3

So then that leaves me with one person's testimony,

4 Mr. Braithwaite. Defense would like to attack Mr. Braithwaite
5 because his testimony is not consistent with that of Mr. Taylor
6 and Mr. Breck. No, very rarely is testimony consistent, but
7 Mr. Braithwaite is the one independent witness who really does
8 have an opportunity to observe what occurred, and this Court
9 does believe him when he stated that he observed some kind of
10 an incident occurring between Mr. Beck and Mr. Taylor.
11

Whether that incident, as Mr. Beck describes it, for

12 whatever reasons he chooses to remember what occurs, whether
13 it was being grabbed by the shoulders and twisted, I don't
14 know, but this Court does believe that there was touching
15 that occurred, and that there was a shoving that occurred.
16 Mr. Braithwaite — he may not have shoved him six times, and
17 he may not have fallen back 24 or 30 feet, but I don't think
18 that Mr. Braithwaite made up the fact that there was some
19 physical confrontation between these two individuals. I do
20 not believe that what he observed was the defensive move on
21 behalf of Mr. Taylor's part.
22

Now, in regards to self-defense, I did not really hear

23 any testimony other than Mr. Taylor's story and Mr. Holstein
24 that all of a sudden Mr. Beck came at him and Mr. Taylor just
25 put up his hands, and there might have been a touching or not.
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1 I think more than that occurred, and I do not believe that in
2 that particular regard that Mr. Beck was doing anything, whether
3 rightly or wrongly, for whatever reasons he chose, but to go
4 back and try and finish the job that he started.
5

I believe that Mr. Taylor may be — may have been

6 incredibly frustrated, that there may have been an argument
7 between the two, that Mr. Beck may not have been cooperative,
8 that he may not have been answering the questions, that he may
9 have also used foul and abusive language, that he may have
10 persisted in doing a job that maybe he shouldn't have persisted
11 in doing, but this Court believes that Mr. Taylor lost his
12 temper for whatever reason, and whether strongly — not
13 strongly. Obviously Mr. Beck didn't lose his feet, but he
14 attempted to push Mr. Beck away.
15

Now, you bring up the self-defense.

I do not feel

16 that I've heard any testimony that rises to the level of self17 defense. You bring up the issue of being on his property. To
18 be honest with you, I didn't necessarily hear any testimony
19 that any of this occurred on Bricks property.

In fact, it was

20 Mr. Beck's testimony that it happened out in the road. Even
21 the first mark that he was trying to erase was still out off
22 of Bricks' property.
23

Even if it occurred on Bricks' property I don't think

24 that Mr. Taylor was legally allowed to use any kind of force to
25 remove Mr. Beck, especially when Mr. Beck is there for a utility
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1 company, and probably they do have an easement and a right-of2 way when he's doing his job. The proper thing obviously would
3 have been to call Blue Stakes before this occurred, not after it
4 occurred.
5

This Court does not make a decision based on any

6 consequences that might occur. I understand that there is
7 another lawsuit. Again, I understand that both parties have
8 selective memory in regards to this matter, but I can't concern
9 myself with what that other lawsuit is, and I wouldn't one way
10 or the other, but based on the evidence I've heard here today,
11 based on the credibility of the witnesses, based strongly on
12 Mr. Braithwaite's testimony, this Court is convinced that there
13 was an assault that occurred, and therefore finds Mr. Taylor
14 guilty of the charge.
15

Counsel, in regards to sentencing, do you want

16 sentencing to occur today?
17

MR. BOND: I think we'd waive the time for that.

18

THE COURT: All right. Anything from the City prior to

19 sentencing?
20

MS. PARKINSON: Your Honor, the City would submit, but

21 the City would like your Honor to know that he does have a prior
22 assault on a peace officer. It was in 1998, and our office has
23 had numerous situations and dealings with — although its not
24 necessarily related to violence, but with some dealings with
25 Bricks.

State would just submit.

